1. INTRODUCTION

The book under review constitutes, to my knowledge, one of the few collections of essays within the cognitive linguistics paradigm that is exclusively dedicated to the relationship of metonymy and pragmatic inference (as the editors show, some other related works on the conceptual, pragmatic, and grammatical role of metonymy are Marmaridou, 2000; Panther & Radden, 1999; Barcelona, 2000; Dirven & Pörings, 2002; and the monograph by Ruiz de Mendoza & Otal, 2002).

As is claimed in the introduction, in the relatively short history of cognitive linguistics, metonymy has often been regarded as a referential phenomenon (where a referent is used to stand for another referent) which involves a stand for relationship. Nonetheless, the editors are right in that metonymy is better viewed (following Kövecses & Radden’s proposal, 1999) as a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity provides mental access to another conceptual entity within a single conceptual domain. However, as Panther & Thornburg admit, this is too broad a definition, and this is why they set out to narrow its scope by including in it only contingent relationships. Then, they show how the term metonymy covers different types of inference, for instance, how an attribute of a speech act may stand for the whole speech act, just as an attribute of a person can stand for the person. In fact, they show that metonymy does play a crucial role at the levels
of reference, predication, proposition, and illocution; in this way, metonymy may be seen as a bridge between pragmatics and cognitive linguistics. In general, the introduction is well-written and informative but it lacks some information on the history of metonymy that may provide the reader with the necessary theoretical background for the cutting-edge issues covered in the rest of the book. Thus, the study of metonymy does not appear in the 80s with Lakoff, but there has been some development from a rhetorical conception of metonymy as a figure of speech to the cognitive linguistics view of metonymy as a mental operation which even subsumes different theories of metonymy. Furthermore, some emphasis could have been made on the fact that the study of metonymy, contrary to the case of metaphor, which has always attracted most of the attention, has gained importance over the last years.

2. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF CONTENTS

The overall organisation of the book consists of four parts. The first one concerns the definition of the role of metonymy in inferential utterance interpretation (which comprises the papers by Ruiz de Mendoza & Pérez, and Barcelona) and conceptual blends (with Coulson & Oakley’s paper). The second part is devoted to the metonymic motivation of grammatical structure (with the papers by Stefanowitsch, Panther & Thornburg, and Köpcke & Zubin). The third part is aimed at exploring the role of metonymic inferencing in linguistic change (it includes the papers by Ziegeler and Okamoto). Finally, part IV attempts to see what metonymies can offer from a cross-linguistic perspective (it contains the papers by Radden & Seto, and Brdar & Brdar-Szabó). At the end, we also find useful metonymy, metaphor, and subject indexes.

In chapter 1, “Cognitive Operations and Pragmatic Implications,” the authors make use of the notion of conceptual metonymy and metaphor to explore some possible connections between Cognitive Linguistics, Relevance Theory, and post-Gricean pragmatics in general. Besides reducing metonymies to the types target-in-source (the source domain stands for a target sub-domain) and source-in-target (a source sub-domain stands for a target domain), Ruiz de Mendoza & Pérez claim that metaphor and metonymy are part of what is said (i.e. they are included within explicatures) rather than what is implicated; this does not mean that these cognitive constructs are just loose ways of speaking exclusively regulated by the principle of relevance, as Carston (1997, 2000) seems to imply. On the contrary, the authors claim that the relevance-theoretic account must be supplemented by postulating the cognitive linguistics notion of mapping. In this sense, after establishing correlations
between these different kinds of mapping and the explicatures they produce, they
draw a distinction between one-correspondence and many-correspondence
metaphors, which provides the basis for a metaphor-metonymy continuum. Finally,
they put forward the Domain Availability Principle to account for those anaphoric
relations in discourse that involve referential metonymic shifts, and according to
which the matrix domain determines the domain of co-reference. Although this is
one of the most comprehensible and clearest papers of the book under review,
some remarks are in order. First of all, one of the main problems as regards many-
correspondence metaphors lies in the fact that there is no principled account of
how the hearer knows what correspondences should be taken as intended by the
speaker. Then, as regards the classification of metaphors, the authors seem to imply
that the PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS metaphors are cases of one-correspondence
mappings in which attributed animal behaviour is mapped onto human behaviour;
from my point of view, this is an overgeneralisation since, for instance, Aquilles is
a lion might suggest different behavioural features of Achilles (e.g. strength,
courage, majesty, etc.). To end with, we doubt whether some of the examples given
within the section related to the interaction between metaphor and metonymy could
be better explained, if not entirely, on the basis of conceptual blending theory as
developed by Fauconnier & Turner (2002).

Chapter 2, entitled “Metonymy and Conceptual Blending,” tries to account
for the role of metonymy in the process of conceptual blending, a theory recently
developed by Fauconnier and Turner. This theory explains metaphor and analogy
as the result of a blending process which results from the projection of conceptual
structure, correlated on the basis of skeletal information contained in a generic
space, from two input spaces into a blend. The blend thus integrates part of the
structure from the input spaces into more complex events, thus becoming
dynamic. The projections, which may operate in parallel in the case of complex
examples, may be based on similarity, identity, analogy, and other pragmatic
functions, including metonymy. In their account, the authors analyse different
phenomena (idioms, literary blends, sculptural blends, etc.) in order to show that
metonymies are crucial in blending since, in creating tighter connections, they
help integrate juxtapositions of conceptual structure from distally related domains.
In this connection, metonymies (working at the expense of the topology principle
which requires that the models in the spaces be structurally similar) contribute to
the integration principle, which is part of the optimality principle that ultimately
guides and constrains the different projections between the spaces. In general,
this paper is more descriptive than explanatory; it does not provide the reader
with new theoretical insights, but applies in a lucid manner conceptual blending
postulates to a number of linguistic and cognitive phenomena. However, the most
innovative aspect of the paper, i.e. the essential role that metonymy seems to play within conceptual blending, is interestingly analysed although not in great detail. This point and its theoretical significance should be further studied and backed up with more examples.

Chapter 3, under the title “The Case for a Metonymic Basis of Pragmatic Inferencing: Evidence from Jokes and Funny Anecdotes,” aims at studying the role of metonymy in pragmatic inferencing by means of analysing the comprehension of jokes and similar types of discourse which, even though they often involve complex inferential mechanisms, are understood at an incredible speed. This is so because, along with Gricean maxims, the inferential processes required for their interpretation are facilitated either by pre-existing metonymic connections (which especially “seem to lie at the very heart of pragmatic inferencing” since they help accomplish the “frame adjustment” which is required to work out the punchline of jokes) in a cognitive frame, or by pre-existing metaphorical connections across frames. In the same way that the editors of the volume, Barcelona makes use of Kövecses & Radden’s (1999) idea that metonymy is not a purely referential phenomenon, thus extending its explanatory scope to the domain of pragmatic inferencing. In general, the paper claims that pragmatic processing is notably simplified by the existing metonymies, which provide the hearer with immediate and easy-to-access inferences; that may be true, but we should bear in mind that, no matter the extent to which we generalise the inferences, we will always have to explain how hearers select and go through them. In fact, the storage, functioning, and manipulation of all these aspects constitute difficulties for pragmatic interpretation.

Chapter 4, “A construction-Based Approach to Indirect Speech Acts” attempts to explain how the hearer reaches the interpretation intended by the speaker as regards indirect speech acts (ISAs), such as Will/can you close the door? By using some of Sadock’s (1974) collocational criteria for conventionalised indirect requests (e.g. the option to insert politeness markers such as please or kindly, or using the conditional would/could), the author arrives at the conclusion that certain aspects of conventionalised indirect speech acts are not predictable from their form and constituent meaning components, thereby qualifying as constructions (i.e. their illocutionary force is directly linked to their form). Then, Stefanowitsch claims that ISA constructions are totally conventional but, in spite of their partially unpredictable properties, Panther & Thornburg’s theory of speech act metonymies (basically, an utterance that refers to any aspect of the model can metonymically evoke the whole model) provides the motivation for the similarity in form between the conventionalised indirect speech acts and the direct speech acts on which they
seem to be based. However, since their pragmatic function is part of their meaning, there is no need for the speaker/hearer to process ISAs metonymically. Finally, Stefanowitsch analyses some neurolinguistic evidence about the interpretation of ISAs, showing how this could account for the analysis of conventionalised ISAs as constructions. In my view, Stefanowitsch's account is somewhat lacking in explanatory and innovative value. Noting the conventional value of some ISA constructions does not preclude the metonymic account from having a strong explanatory value when interpreting the less conventionalised examples. He also overlooks other relevant approaches to the issue of ISAs within cognitive linguistics (e.g. Ruiz de Mendoza, 1999; Pérez, 2001; Pérez & Ruiz de Mendoza, 2002).

In chapter 5, under the name “Metonymies as Natural Inference and Activation schemas: The Case of Dependent Clauses as Independent Speech Acts,” the editors of this volume analyse some if-clauses that lack a syntactically realised consequent clause (e.g. If you would like a cookie, standing for an offer) but that qualify as constructions in Goldberg's (1995) terms as they have a non-compositional conventional sense associated with them. Then, the authors go on to describe three types of conventionalised pragmatic functions of such constructions, namely, deontic (which involve speaker commitment or hearer obligation; e.g. If you would like a cookie), expressive (showing surprise, shock; e.g. Why, if it isn’t Susan!), and epistemic (expressing reasoning, belief; e.g. If it was a warning). Furthermore, in order to determine the degree of conventionalisation of these types of clause, the authors apply Grice's cancelability test together with the concept of mental space from conceptual blending theory and their approach to indirect speech acts as conceptual scenarios. They conclude that even though conceptual metonymies are natural inference schemas that lead to utterance meanings quickly and effortlessly, regardless of their degree of conventionalisation (no matter how conventional they are, they are automatically activated in the interpretation process), many of these incomplete clauses do not require any inferential work; thus, they are quite in line with Stefanowitsch’s views. Panther & Thornburg’s arguments are persuasive; however, it is the reviewer's belief that this chapter would greatly benefit from taking into account recent developments in the analysis of if-conditionals (e.g. Sweetser & Dancygier, forthcoming) within the Cognitive Linguistics paradigm.

Chapter 6, entitled “Metonymic Pathways to Neuter-Gender Human Nominals in German,” tries to account for the fact that metonymic principles may interact in complex ways with grammatical gender in German (as part of the diachronic lexical processes that result in neut-gender human nouns, and then in the pragmatics of referential tracking). Thus, they show that some affective metonymic models (often conveying negative connotations such as dissaproval, scorn, etc.) work within
certain neuter-marked nominals referring to women. This is a rather surprising fact since German has its own masculine and feminine systems. To close the paper, the authors explore the role played by metonymic scenarios in the choice of anaphoric pronouns in discourse. In spite of the fact that the paper under review would be extremely interesting for a conference or publication on Women Studies and Feminism, it lacks a good summative summary or conclusion; the one included just goes on to show the current cultural validity of neut-gender terms for women and their projected metonymic ICMs.

In Chapter 7, under the title of “The Development of Counterfactual Implicature: A Case of Metonymy or M-inference?” Debra Ziegeler addresses the issue (and in so doing she criticises Levinson, 1995, 2000) that some statements of past ability or potentiality may metonymically imply both the actuality and the non-occurrence (counterfactuality) of events in the infinitival complement clause (e.g. John *could solve the problem* may either mean that he solved it or that he didn’t solve it). She also claims that *M-implicatures* (in Levinson’s terms, inferences that refer to the more marked element of a manner set; e.g. regarding *can* and *have the ability to*, the latter would be the marked one as it is longer and more periphrastic) are not prototypical metonymic inferences since they are not content-to-content relationship, but link the marked form with the negation of what the unmarked one expresses. She also challenges the well-established assumption that *had the ability to* and *could* are synonymous by means of analysing their contexts and forms within a diachronic corpus. She closes the paper by saying that the contrast between the metonymies *POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY* and *POTENTIALITY FOR NON-ACTUALITY* is due to pragmatic and scalar factors (of the type *She may be coming* vs. *She is coming*, in which the former expresses possibility and the latter certainty). Ziegeler’s paper is very interesting, informative, and well-written but it touches so many different issues and concepts that it is at points hard to understand and follow. In fact, the density of the article is so high that the author has been led to include an interim summary.

Chapter 8, entitled “Metonymy and Pragmatic Inference in the Functional Reanalysis of Grammatical Morphemes in Japanese,” explores the role of metonymy in instances of grammaticalisation in Japanese that involve the reanalysis of complementisers as sentence-final particles, i.e. grammatical morphemes that are common in Japanese and give interesting examples of functional shifts in linguistic forms, besides expressing various pragmatic meanings (e.g. *no, koto* –the focus of the paper–, *to, tte, ka*). For example, the use of *koto* as an SFP is shown to have evolved from *koto* as a COMP by means of functional reanalysis. This evolution involves a shift from conversational implicature to conventional implicature in which, by means of a metonymy, the proposition expressed by *koto* stands for the
proposition together with its conversationally implied modalities –or the pragmatic function of the proposition; in other words, the whole is thus represented by its part. The paper is generally clear and well-written. As the author himself suggests, many other subordinate clause markers should be examined (also cross-linguistically) and historical data provided in order to fully account for these processes of grammaticalisation and reanalysis.

Chapter 9, “Metonymic construals of shopping requests in HAVE- and BE-languages,” accounts for how HAVE- and BE- languages (such as English and Japanese respectively) code the notion of “possession” differently, in such a way that the metonymies that link the indirect wording to the intended speech act meaning are different as well. Thus, different speech communities make use of different metonymic reasoning in coding and understanding a request. All this is illustrated by the shopping scenario, which leads to metonymies such as POSSESSION FOR AVAILABILITY –the store is in control of the goods it offers for sale– or TRANSFER FOR TRANSACTION –the object bought is received by the customer passing into his possession. The paper further concludes that HAVE-languages metonymically express the notions of availability and requested transaction as possession, whereas BE-languages construe these notions as existence. Besides establishing a conceptual continuum between possession and existence, the authors show that the different cultural systems of politeness –indirectness vs. deference– even explain the absence or presence of some metonymies (such as TRANSFER FOR TRANSACTION); this may be related to the way of viewing events (DO-languages such as English focus on actions and their results, whereas BECOME-languages such as Japanese focus on processes as happening). This is a very interesting paper which has cast further light onto how different languages and cultures code things in different ways. On the basis of this research, further work should be carried out to determine to what extent culture influences the way things are expressed in a language.

Finally, “Metonymic coding of linguistic action in English, Croatian and Hungarian” examines in detail sentences like I’ll be brief, which can be understood via a metonymy (in this case, SPEAKER FOR UTTERANCE, a subtype of the more general metonymy AGENT FOR ACTION: “My speech/words will be brief”). In comparing English, Croatian, and Hungarian the authors show that the Croatian and Hungarian languages are more likely to make explicit the linguistic action itself in such a way that whereas these languages tend to avoid predicational metonymies, referential metonymies are common. On the contrary, they postulate that languages which largely exploit predicational metonymies will also make extensive use of referential metonymies. This is a clear, straightforward chapter which presents no flaws at all.
To conclude, this is an interesting collection of essays which has cast further light onto the recent study on the conceptual, pragmatic, and grammatical role of metonymy, besides emphasising the idea that the study of conceptual metonymy provides important insights into language use and language structure.

The volume seems to be mainly aimed at an audience already working within Cognitive Linguistics as it deals with controversial theoretical issues adopting a deep, thorough level of analysis. Actually, the book has helped clarify some problematic issues which lie behind the definition of the role of metonymy in inferential utterance interpretation, conceptual blends, and linguistic change; the metonymic motivation of grammatical structure; and the study of metonymy from a cross-linguistic perspective.

REFERENCES


