Jaded selves and body distance: a case study of Cotard’s syndrome in “Infinite Jest”

Ana Chapman

doi:10.18172/jes.3953

Autores/as

Ana Chapman University of Málaga

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18172/jes.3953

Palabras clave:

Agencia, experiencia corpórea, David Foster Wallace, conciencia de sí mismo, adicción, literatura cognitiva

Resumen

Este artículo pretende mostrar la importancia de las emociones y las sensaciones que emergen en la representación del cuerpo y en el (r)establecimiento de la identidad en la novela Infinite Jest, de David Foster Wallace. En ella se percibe un mundo donde la sobresaturación de elecciones de entretenimiento ha creado una tradición de hastío y adicción como parte de la búsqueda hedonística del placer. Esto es relevante para comprender los efectos sobre el “yo” y la agencia y que, consecuentemente, se pueden enmarcar en desórdenes mentales. Desde un enfoque neurocientífico, la descripción de los personajes que narra Wallace es analizado en su posible conexión con el síndrome de Cotard. Este delirio ayuda a mostrar cómo la falta de emociones invalida una representación correcta del cuerpo, dando así lugar a la creencia de uno mismo de estar muerto o ser inexistente en la novela.

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Biografía del autor/a

Ana Chapman, University of Málaga

Ana Chapman, PhD, is a lecturer at the University of Málaga. She holds an MA in American Literature from the University of Sheffield and then completed her PhD on David Foster Wallace’s novel Infinite Jest at the University of Seville. She is a member of the research group “Discursos de la Postmodernidad” (HUM 399). Her main research interests are the representation of body and mind in contemporary English literature, neuroscience in literature, and the effects of the media and technology on society.

Ana Chapman. Departamento de Filología Inglesa, Francesa y Alemana. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Universidad de Málaga. Campus de Teatinos. 29071, Málaga, Spain. Tel.: +34 952131782

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